Causal exclusion without explanatory exclusion
Palavras-chave:Mind, Causation, Explanation, Exclusion, Physicalism, Supervenience
The causal/explanatory exclusion argument is one of the principal weapons against the possibility of mental causes/explanations having genuine causal/explanatory have genuine casual/explanatory power. I argue that the causal and the explanatory versions of the exclusion argument should be distinguished. There are really two arguments, one of them perhaps successful, the other one not.
Davidson, D. (1995) Thinking Causes, in J. Heil & A. Mele (eds.) Mental Causation (Oxford University Press, Oxford).
Kim, J. (1994). Explanatory Knowledge and Metaphysical Dependence, Philosophical Issues, 5.
Kim, J. (1996). Philosophy of Mind (Boulder, Westview Press).
Kim, J. (1998). Mind in a Physical World (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press).
Copyright (c) 2002 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.