Mentalistic explanation and mental causation

Autores

  • Sanford C. Goldberg University of Kentucky

Palavras-chave:

Explanation, Mental causation, Belief

Resumo

In this paper I present an internal difficulty for the hypothesis that mentalistic explanation is causal explanation. My thesis is that intuitively acceptable mentalistic explanations appear to violate constraints imposed by the mental causation hypothesis.

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Biografia do Autor

Sanford C. Goldberg, University of Kentucky

Professor of Philosophy at the University of Kentucky.

Referências

Audi, R. (1994). Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe, Nous 28:4, pp. 419-434.

Bach, K. (1997). Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs?, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78, pp. 215-241.

Braun. D. (1991). Content, Causation, and Cognitive Science, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69:4, pp. 375-389.

Braun. D. (1995). Causally Relevant Properties, Philosophical Perspectives 9, pp. 447-475.

Goldberg, S. (2002). Belief and Its Linguistic Expression, Philosophical Psychology 15:1, pp. 65-76.

Nisbett, R.E. & Wilson, T.D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes, Psychological Review 84, pp. 231-259.

Segal, G. & Sober, E. (1990). The Causal Efficacy of Content, Philosophical Studies 63, pp. 1-30.

Shier, D. (1996). Direct Reference for the Narrow Minded, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77, pp. 225-248.

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Publicado

2002-03-31

Como Citar

GOLDBERG, S. C. Mentalistic explanation and mental causation. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 25, n. 3, p. 199–216, 2002. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644651. Acesso em: 5 fev. 2023.

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