Palavras-chave
Mental causation
Belief
Como Citar
Resumo
In this paper I present an internal difficulty for the hypothesis that mentalistic explanation is causal explanation. My thesis is that intuitively acceptable mentalistic explanations appear to violate constraints imposed by the mental causation hypothesis.
Referências
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