Palavras-chave
objectivity
interpretation
explicitation
Como Citar
Resumo
Robert Brandom has maintained that Wittgenstein is wrong in denying the notion of interpretation any theoretical role in the task of accounting for our linguistic practices. In this paper, I intend to throw some doubts on this thesis. First of all, I argue that Brandom ́s objection is unfair: in my opinion, giving up the concept of interpretation does not amount to condemning oneself to silence on rule – governed practices. Secondly, I try to show that Brandom ́s appeal to the concept of implicit interpretation is not without problems in as far as it involves the thesis that all the participants in a certain practice may be wrong about the interpretation of its rules. This makes room for a dichotomy between what we do and what we say we do, which should be thoroughly avoided.
Referências
BAKER, G.P. & HACKER, P.M.S. (1984). “Critical Study: On Misunderstanding Wittgenstein: Kripke’s Private Language Argument” Synthese LVIII.
BRANDOM, R. (1994). Making it Explicit (Cambridge, Harvard Univer- sity Press).
———. (1997). “From Truth to Semantics”. In: VILLANUEVA, E. Truth (California, Ridgeview Publishing Co.).
———. (1997). “Replies”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LVII. KRIPKE, S. (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, Harvard University Press).
MACBETH, D. (1997). “Brandom on Inference and the Expressive Role of Logic”. In: VILLANUEVA, E. Truth (California, Ridge- view Publishing Co.).
WITTGENSTEIN, L. (1958). Philosophical Investigation (Basil Blackwell). Edición española Investigaciones Filosóficas del Instituto de Investiga- ciones Filosóficas de la UNAM, traducción de A. García Suárez y U. Moulines.
———. (1983). Remarks of Foundations of Mathematics, 3rd edition (Cambridge, The MIT Press).
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