Singular Reference Without Singular Thought

Autores

  • Filipe Martone Universidade Estadual de Campinas

Palavras-chave:

Reference. Singular thought. Acquaintance. Epistemology. Semantics.

Resumo

In this paper I challenge the widespread assumption that the conditions for singular reference are more or less the same as the conditions for singular thought. I claim that we refer singularly to things without thinking singularly about them more often than it is usually believed. I first argue that we should take the idea that singular thought is non-descriptive thought very seriously. If we do that, it seems that we cannot be so liberal about what counts as acquaintance; only perception (and memory) will do. I also briefly discuss and reject semantic instrumentalism. Finally, I argue that while singular reference is cheap, singular thought comes only at a price.

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Biografia do Autor

Filipe Martone, Universidade Estadual de Campinas

Possuo graduação e mestrado em Filosofia pela Universidade Estadual de Campinas, com período sanduíche na University of California, Santa Barbara. Atualmente, curso doutorado também na Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Meus principais interesses são por Filosofia da Linguagem, Epistemologia e Filosofia da Mente, em especial pelos seguintes assuntos: referência, externalismo, minimalismo semântico, Problema de Frege, modularidade e pensamento singular. 

Referências

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Publicado

2016-10-27

Como Citar

MARTONE, F. Singular Reference Without Singular Thought. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 39, n. 1, p. 34–59, 2016. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8646145. Acesso em: 30 set. 2022.

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Artigos