Paradoxical versus modulated conditional inferences: An explanation from the Stoicism


  • Miguel López-Astorga University of Talca


Conditional. Inference. Mental models. Modulation. Stoicism.


According to standard propositional logic, the inferences in which the conditional introduction rule is used are absolutely correct. However, people do not always accept inferences of that kind. Orenes and Johnson-Laird carried out interesting experiments in this way and, based on the general framework of the mental models theory, explained clearly in which cases and under which circumstances such inferences are accepted and rejected. The goals of this paper are both to better understand some aspects of Stoic logic and to check whether or not that very logic can also offer an account on this issue. My conclusions are that, indeed, this later logic can do that, and that the results obtained by Orenes and Johnson-Laird can be explained based on the information that the sources provide on Stoic logic.


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Biografia do Autor

Miguel López-Astorga, University of Talca

Institute of Humanistic Studies "Juan Ignacio Molina" University of Talca


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Como Citar

LÓPEZ-ASTORGA, M. Paradoxical versus modulated conditional inferences: An explanation from the Stoicism. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 39, n. 1, p. 62–72, 2016. Disponível em: Acesso em: 30 set. 2022.