Una critítica al criterio de correción para distinguir entre tipos de procesos subyacentes en una teoria híbrida de mindreading

Autores

  • Fernanda Velázquez Coccia Universidade Estadual de Campinas

Palavras-chave:

Enfoques híbridos de la capacidad mentalista. Teoría de la teoría. Teoría de la simulación

Resumo

Los enfoques híbridos de mindreading postulan procesos de “teoría” y “simulación” como subyacentes a esta capacidad. Un problema actual es ofrecer criterios para evaluar las teorías híbridas. Aquí, analizaré el “criterio de corrección” propuesto por Stich & Nichols (2003, Nichols & Stich 2003) para discriminar entre tipos de procesos subyacentes a mindreading. Según éste, si el resultado demindreading es correcto es probable que el proceso subyacente sea de tipo simulacional, y si el resultado de mindreading es incorrecto es probable que el proceso subyacente sea de bases de información (o teoría). Sostendré que la corrección o incorrección del resultado de mindreading no permite distinguir entre tipos de proceso. Intentaré mostrar que los argumentos a favor de un proceso simulacional subyacente a mindreading exitoso no descartan explicaciones de bases de información para este mismo fenómeno. A su vez, argumentaré que es posible que un proceso de tipo simulacional subyazca a mindreading incorrecto.

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Biografia do Autor

Fernanda Velázquez Coccia, Universidade Estadual de Campinas

Universidad de Buenos Aires. Instituto de Filosofia

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Publicado

2016-10-27

Como Citar

VELÁZQUEZ COCCIA, F. Una critítica al criterio de correción para distinguir entre tipos de procesos subyacentes en una teoria híbrida de mindreading. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 39, n. 2, p. 31–31, 2016. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8647291. Acesso em: 30 set. 2022.

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