Epistemic immodesty and embodied rationality


  • Giovanni Rolla Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul


Disjunctivism. Dream skepticism rationality actionism.


Based on Pritchard’s distinction (2012, 2016) between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably motivated. In order to block the dream argument skeptical conclusion, I present a version of phenomenological disjunctivism based on Noë’s actionist account of perceptual consciousness (2012). This suggests that perceptual knowledge is rationally grounded because it is a form of embodied achievement – what I call embodied rationality –, which offers a way of dissolving the pseudo-problem of epistemic immodesty, namely, the seemingly counterintuitive thesis that one can acquire rationally grounded knowledge that one is not in a radical skeptical scenario.


Não há dados estatísticos.

Biografia do Autor

Giovanni Rolla, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul

Doutorando em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul desde 2014 e bolsista CAPES. É mestre em Filosofia (2013) e bacharel em Filosofia (2010) pela mesma universidade. Atua principalmente com os seguintes temas: teorias do conhecimento, justificação epistêmica, ceticismo, filosofia da mente, filosofia da linguagem e normatividade.


ALSTON, W. “An Internalist Externalism.” Synthese 74, PP. 265–83, 1988.

AUSTIN, J. L. Sense and Sensibilia. London: Oxford University Press, 1962.

BOYLE, M. “Additive Theories of Rationality: A Critique.” European Journal of Philosophy. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8641840. Forthcoming.

BRUECKNER, A. “The Structure of the Skeptical Argument.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4), pp. 143–59, 1994.

CIANCIOLO, A, T., STERNBERG, R. J. Intelligence - a Brief History. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004.

DRETSKE, F. “Epistemic Operators.” The Journal of Philosophy 67 (24), pp. 1007–23, 1970.

EVANS, G. The Varieties of Reference. Edited by John McDowell. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982.

HADDOCK, A. MACPHERSON, F. “Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge.” Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

HETHERINGTON, S. How to Know - a Practicalist Conception of Knowledge. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

HINTON, J. M. “Visual Experiences.” Mind 76 (302), pp. 217–27, 1967.

PRINZ, J. “Is Consciousness Embodied.” In The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, edited by Philip Robbins and Murat Aydede, 419–36. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

KOHLER, I. “Formation and Transformation of the Perceptual World.” Psychological Issues 3 (4), pp. 1–173, 1951.

LABERGE, S. “Lucid Dreaming: Evidence and Methodology.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6), pp. 962–63, 2000.

MCDOWELL, J. “Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge.” Proceedings of the British Academy, no. 68, pp. 455–79, 1982

MCDOWELL, J. Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2011.

MOYAL-SHARROCK, D. Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

NOË, A. Action in Perception. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2004.

NOË, A. Varieties of Perception. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012.

O’REAGAN, J.K, DEUBEL, H., CLARK, J.J., RENSINK, J.A. “Picture Changes during Blinks: Looking without Seeing and Seeing without Looking.” Visual Cognition 7 (1.2.3), pp. 191–212, 2000.

ROBBINS, P., AYDEDE M. The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

PRITCHARD, D. Epistemological Disjunctivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

PRITCHARD, D. Epistemic Angs: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016.

RÖDL, S. Self-Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007.

SOSA, E. A Virtue Epistemology, Vol I. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

STENBERG, R. J. “The Theory of Successful Intelligence.” Interamerican Journal of Psychology 39 (2), pp. 189–202, 2005.

STRATTON, G. M. “Vision without Inversion of the Retinal Image.” Psychological Review 4: 341–60, pp. 463–81, 1897.

TAYLOR, J. G. The Behavioral Basis of Perception. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.

VARELA, F.J., THOMPSON, E., ROSCH, E. The Embodied Mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991.

WILLIAMSON, T. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

WITTGENSTEIN, L. On Certainty. Edited by Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969.

WRIGHT, C. “Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78, pp. 167–212, 2004.




Como Citar

ROLLA, G. Epistemic immodesty and embodied rationality. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 39, n. 3, p. 5–28, 2017. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8647845. Acesso em: 7 fev. 2023.