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Time, Fission, Fusion: An Argument against the Block Universe with Endurance


Ontology of time. Endurance. Exdurance. Temporal experience.

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BALASHOV, Yuri. Time, Fission, Fusion: An Argument against the Block Universe with Endurance. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 40, n. 1, p. 109–143, 2017. Disponível em: Acesso em: 20 maio. 2024.


Many philosophers believe in the Block Universe containing all objects and events – those that we intuitively call past, present, and future. But some of those who endorse this ontology of time also believe that objects persist by enduring – by being present in their entirety at all moments at which they exist. This combination of views, the Block Universe with Endurance, has survived the initial assault of the problem of temporary intrinsics and of several later objections. But I argue that the Block Universe with Endurance fails to account for a striking feature of our temporal experience and must be rejected in favor of the Block Universe with Exdurance.


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