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El Realismo Estructural Óntico (REO) afirma que la ontología del mundo físico debe ser (re)concebida de modo que las puras estructuras sean sus entidades básicas. Objetos y propiedades deben ser eliminados en favor de las estructuras. No obstante, sus defensores afirman que dichas puras estructuras son capaces de dar cuenta de la realidad física, o bien porque identifican el mundo físico con una estructura matemática, o bien porque sostienen que las estructuras postuladas por el REO no son estructuras abstractas, sino físicas. En el presente trabajo analizo críticamente ambas estrategias a fin de mostrar sus limitaciones. Asimismo, propongo un nuevo marco fisicalista, adecuado para las ontologías estructuralistas.Referências
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