ResumoAccording to the fallibilist, it is possible for us to know things when our evidence doesn't entail that our beliefs are correct. Even if there is some chance that we're mistaken about p, we might still know that p is true. Fallibilists will tell you that an important virtue of their view is that infallibilism leads to skepticism. In this paper, we'll see that fallibilist impurism has considerable skeptical consequences of its own. We've missed this because we've focused our attention on the high-stakes cases that they discuss in trying to motivate their impurism about knowledge. We'll see this once we think about the fallibilist impurist's treatment of low-stakes cases. […] when error would be especially disastrous, few possibilities are properly ignored (Lewis 1996: 556, n. 12).
ANDERSON, C. "On the Intimate Relationship of Knowledge and Action". Episteme 12: 343-53, 2015.
ANDERSON, C. & HAWTHORNE, J. (forthcoming). "Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes". In J. Hawthorne, & T. Gendler (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology (Vol. 6). Oxford University Press.
BROWN, J. "Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning". Nous 42: 167-89, 2008.
DUTANT, J. "How to be an Infallibilist". Philosophical Issues 26: 148-71, 2016.
FANTL, J., & MCGRATH, M. Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford University Press, 2009.
HAWTHORNE, J. Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press, 2004.
LEWIS, D. "Elusive Knowledge". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 549-67, 1996.
ROEBER, B. (forthcoming). "The Pragmatic Encroachment Debate". Nous.
WILLIAMSON, T. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.