Omniscience and Semantic Information

Autores

  • Bernardo Alonso Universidade Federal do Mato Grosso

Palavras-chave:

Logical Omniscience Problem. Knowledge. Semantic Informatio.

Resumo

First, I consider a few motivations to idealize epistemic logics1 in such a degree that brings up the problem of logical omniscience [LOP]. I argue that the main motivation to hold omniscience is of a philosophical-scientific2 background (Stalnaker 1991), in the sense philosophers have a not so peculiar way of investigating underlying mechanisms, i.e., the interaction of several different components of complex systems may be better understood in isolation, even if such components are not found isolated in a realistic context. It is defended that the implicit and explicit knowledge distinction (Fagin and Halpern 1988) is compatible that view since idealizations made by modal epistemic logic are so strong that the agents they describe hardly have anything in common with real agents. I conclude by showing how LOP can be accommodated in the logic of being informed (Floridi 2006) using the Inverse Relationship Principle (Barwise and Seligman 1997).

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Biografia do Autor

Bernardo Alonso, Universidade Federal do Mato Grosso

Universidade Federal do Mato Grosso Department of Philosophy Cuiaba, MA Brazil.

Referências

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Publicado

2017-12-05

Como Citar

ALONSO, B. Omniscience and Semantic Information. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 40, n. 4, p. 77–96, 2017. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8651129. Acesso em: 3 out. 2022.

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