Epistemological closed questions: A reply to Greco

Autores

  • Charles Côte-Bouchard University of New Jersey

Palavras-chave:

Metaepistemology. Epistemology. Metaethics. ‘Open question’ argument. Epistemic normativity.

Resumo

According to G.E. Moore’s ‘Open Question’ argument (OQA), moral facts cannot be reduced or analyzed in non-normative natural terms. Does the OQA apply equally in the epistemic domain? Does Moore’s argument have the same force against reductionist accounts of epistemic facts and concepts? In a recent article, Daniel Greco has argued that it does. According to Greco (2015), an epistemological version of the OQA is just as promising as its moral cousin, because the relevant questions in epistemology are just as ‘open’ as those in ethics. In this paper, I offer a two-part reply to Greco. First, I argue that his argument in favor of the openness of epistemology is not persuasive. Second, I offer a case against the openness of epistemology. Unlike claims linking natural and moral properties, claims linking natural and epistemological properties do give rise to closed questions. An epistemological OQA is therefore not as promising as its moral cousin.

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Biografia do Autor

Charles Côte-Bouchard, University of New Jersey

Rutgers - State University of New Jersey Department of Philosophy New Jersey, USA.

Referências

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Publicado

2017-12-05

Como Citar

CÔTE-BOUCHARD, C. Epistemological closed questions: A reply to Greco. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 40, n. 4, p. 97–111, 2017. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8651130. Acesso em: 3 out. 2022.

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