Epistemic Internalism and Knowledge-Relevant Anti-Individualist Responsibility

Autores

  • Leandro de Brasi Universidad Alberto Hurtado

Palavras-chave:

Epistemic externalism. Epistemic responsibility. Epistemic interdependence. Epistemic anti-individualism.

Resumo

In contemporary epistemology, there are a number of particular internalism/externalism debates. My concern here is with the internalism/externalism controversy about some specific positive epistemic status required for knowledge which is normally understood in terms of epistemic responsibility. I argue that, given our pervasive epistemic interdependence, such particular debate needs to be reformulated in anti-individualistic terms if it is to be an interesting one.

Downloads

Não há dados estatísticos.

Biografia do Autor

Leandro de Brasi, Universidad Alberto Hurtado

Universidad Alberto Hurtado Department of Philosophy Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades Alameda Santiago, Chile.

Referências

ALSTON, W. “Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology.” Philosophical Topics, 14.1 pp.179-221, 1986.

______ “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification.” Philosophical Perspectives, 2, pp.257-99, 1988a.

______ “An Internalist Externalism.” Synthese, 74.3, pp.265-83, 1988b.

______ Beyond “Justification”: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation. New York: Cornell University Press, 2005.

ARMSTRONG, D. Belief, Truth and Knowledge. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973.

AYER, A. J. “Comments on Professor Williams’ ‘Knowledge and Reasons’.” In G. H. von Wright (ed.) (1972) pp.12-16.

BAEHR, J. “Knowledge need not Be Virtuously Motivated.” In M. Steup, J. Turri and E. Sosa (eds.) (2014a) pp.133-40.

______ “Reply to Zagzebski” In M. Steup, J. Turri and E. Sosa (eds.) (2014b) pp.146-49.

BEDDOR, B. “Process Reliabilism's Troubles with Defeat.” The Philosophical Quarterly, 65.259, pp.145-59, 2015.

BERGMANN, M. Justification without Awareness. NY: Oxford University Press, 2006.

BERNECKER, S., PRITCHARD, D. The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. London: Routledge, 2011.

BONJOUR, L. “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5.1, pp.53-73, 1980.

______ The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. MA: Harvard University Press, 1985.

______ “A Version of Internalist Foundationalism.” In L. BonJour and E. Sosa (eds.) (2003) pp.3-96.

______; SOSA, E. Epistemic Justification. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.

______ . “Recent Work on the Internalism/Externalism Controversy”. In J. Dancy, E. Sosa and M. Steup (eds.) (2010) pp.33-42.

BRANDOM, R. Articulating Reasons. MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.

BRUNER, J. “Policing Epistemic Communities.” Episteme, 10.4, pp.403-16, 2013.

BURGE, T. “Content Preservation.” Philosophical Review, 102.4, pp.457-88, 1993.

______ “Perceptual Entitlement.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67.3, pp.503-48, 2003.

CARRUTHERS, P., CHAMBERLAIN, A. Evolution and the Human Mind. Cambridge: CUP, 2000.

CARTER, A., PALERMOS, O. “Active Externalism and Epistemic Internalism.” Erkenntnis, 80.4, pp.753–72, 2015.

______; PRITCHARD, D. “Epistemic Situationism, Epistemic Dependence and the Epistemology of Education.” In A. Fairweather and M. Alfano (eds.) (2017) pp.168-191.

CHISHOLM, R. Theory of Knowledge. NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977. CODE, L. Epistemic Responsibility. Hanover: Brown University Press, 1987.

COHEN, S. “Justification and Truth” Philosophical Studies, 46, pp.279-95, 1984.

CONEE, E., FELDMAN, R. Evidentialism. Essays in Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.

CULLISON, A. The Bloomsbury Companion to Epistemology. London: Bloomsbury, 2012.

DANCY, J., SOSA, E., STEUP, M. A Companion to Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell, 2010.

FAIRWEATHER, A., ALFANO, M. Epistemic Situationism. London: Oxford University Press, 2017.

FELDMAN, R. “Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation.” In M. Steup (ed.) (2001) pp.77-92.

______; CONEE, E. “Internalism Defended.” American Philosophical Quarterly, 38.1, pp.1-18, 2001.

FOGELIN, R. Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knolwedge and Justification. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

FOLEY, R. The Theory of Epistemic Rationality. MA: Harvard University Press, 1987.

______ “Justified Belief as Responsible Belief.” In M. Steup and E. Sosa. (eds.) (2005) pp.313-26.

FRICKER, E. “Against Gullibility.” In B. K. Matilal and A. Chakrabarti (eds) (1994) pp.89-134.

FUMERTON, R. “The Internalism/Externalism Controversy.” Philosophical Perspectives, 2, pp.443-59, 1988.

GENDLER, T. S., HAWTHORNE, J. Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford: OUP, 2011.

GINET, C. Knowledge, perception and Memory. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975.

GINET, C. “Contra Reliabilsm”. The Monist, 68.2, pp.175-87, 1985.

GOLDBERG, S. “The Division of Epistemic Labor.” Episteme, 8, pp.112-125, 2011.

GOLDBERG, S. “Reliabilism.” In A. Cullison (ed.) (2012) pp.121-142.

GOLDMAN, A. “The Internalist Conception of Justification.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5.1, pp.27-51, 1980.

GOLDMAN, A. Epistemology and Cognition. MA: Harvard University Press, 1986.

GOLDMAN, A. “Internalism Exposed.” The Journal of Philosophy, 96.6, pp.271-93, 1999.

GOLDMAN, A. “Internalism, Externalism and the Architecture of Justification” The Journal of Philosophy, 106.6, pp.309-38, 2009.

GOLDMAN, A. “Systems-Oriented Social Epistemology.” In T. S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.) (2011) pp.132-156.

GRECO, J. “Internalism and Epistemically Responsible Belief.” Synthese, 85, pp.245-77, 1990.

GRECO, J. “Agent Reliabilism.” Philosophical Perspectives, 13, pp.273-96, 1999.

GRECO, J. Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Cambridge: CUP, 2000.

GRECO, J. Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. Cambridge: CUP, 2010.

GRUNDMAN, T. “Reliabilism and the Problem of Defeaters.” Grazer Philosophische Studien, 79, pp.65-76, 2009.

HARDWIG, J. “Epistemic Dependence.” The Journal of Philosophy, 82.7, pp.335- 49, 1985.

HENNING, T., SCHWEIKARD, D. Knowledge, Virtue and Action: Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work. New York: Routledge, 2013.

KALLESTRUP, J., PRITCHARD, D. “Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Dependence.” In T. Henning and D. Schweikard (eds.) (2013) pp.209- 226

KAPLAN, D. “Epistemology on Holiday.” The Journal of Philosophy, 88, pp.132- 154, 1991.

KIM, J. Supervenience and Mind. Selected Philosophical Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

KITCHER, P. The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions. Oxford: OUP, 1993.

KITCHER, P. “Contrasting Conceptions of Social Epistemology.” In F. Schmitt (ed.) (1994) pp.111-134.

KORNBLITH, H. “Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action.” The Philosophical Review, 92.1, pp.33-48, 1983.

KORNBLITH, H. Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism. Malden (MA): Wiley-Blackwell, 2001.

KORNBLITH, H. Knowledge and its place in nature. NY: Oxford University Press, 2002.

KVANVIG, J. The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind: On the Place of the Virtues in Contemporary Epistemology. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992.

LACKEY, J., SOSA, E. The Epistemology of Testimony. NY: Oxford University Press, 2006.

LEHRER, K. Theory of Knowledge. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.

LEWIS, D. “Elusive Knowledge.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, pp.549-67, 1996.

LONGINO, H. The Fate of Knowledge. NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.

MATILAL, B. K., CHAKRABARTI, A. Knowing from Words. Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994.

MEDINA, J. The Epistemology of Resistance. Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations. New York: OUP, 2013.

MILLAR, A. “Knowledge and Recognition.” In D. Pritchard, A. Millar and A. Haddock (eds.) (2010) pp.91-190.

MULDOON, R. “Diversity and the Division of Cognitive Labour.” Philosophy Compass, 8.2, pp.117-25, 2013.

NELSON, L. “Epistemological Communities.” In E. Potter. and L. Alcoff (eds.) (1993) pp.121-160.

NOTTELMANN, N. Blameworthy Belief. A Study in Epistemic Deontologism. Netherlands: Springer, 2007.

NOZICK, R. Philosophical Explanations, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981.

PALERMOS, O. “Knowledge and Cognitive Integration.” Synthese, 191.8, pp.1931-1951, 2014.

PAPINEAU, D. “The Evolution of Knowledge.” In P. Carruthers and A. Chamberlain (eds.) (2000) pp.170-206.

PEELS, R. Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: OUP, 2017.

POTTER, E., ALCOFF, L. Feminist Epistemologies. New York: Routlegde, 1993. PRITCHARD, D. Epistemic Luck. Oxford: OUP, 2005.

POTTER, E.; MILLAR, A., HADDOCK, A. The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

POTTER, E. Epistemological Disjunctivism. Oxford: OUP, 2012.

POTTER, E. “Anti-luck epistemology and the Gettier problem.” Philosophical Studies, 172.1, pp.93-111, 2015a.

POTTER, E. “Epistemic Dependence.” Philosophical Perspectives, 29, pp.305-24, 2015b.

PRYOR, J. “Highlights of Recent Epistemology.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 52.1, pp.95-124, 2001.

ROBERTS, R. C., WOOD, W. J. Intellectual Virtues. An Essay in Regulative Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

SCHMITT, F. Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994.

SMILEY, M. “Collective Responsibility.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2017 Edition), plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/collective-responsibility/. SOSA, E. Knowledge in Perspective. Cambridge: CUP, 1991.

SMILEY, M. “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore” Philosophical Perspectives, 13, pp.141-53, 1999.

SMILEY, M. Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume II. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

SMILEY, M. Judgement and Agency. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

STEUP, M. Epistemic Duty, Evidence and Internality. In M. Steup (ed.) (2001) pp.134-150.

STEUP, M. Knowledge, Truth and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

STEUP, M.; SOSA, E. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. First Edition. Malden (MA): Blackwell, 2005.

STEUP, M.; TURRI, J., SOSA, E. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Second Edition. Malden (MA): Blackwell, 2014.

STICH, S. The Fragmentation of Reason. Preface to a Pragmatic Theory of Cognitive Evaluation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990.

TOWNLEY, C. A Defense of Ignorance: Its Value for Knowers and Roles in Feminist and Social Epistemologies. Maryland: Lexington Books, 2011.

VAHID, H. “Externalism/Internalism.” In S. Bernecker and D. Pritchard (eds.) (2011) pp.144-155.

VON WRIGHT, G. H. Problems in the Theory of Knowledge. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972.

WEBB, M. O. “Why I Know as Much as You: A Reply to Hardwig.” The Journal of Philosophy, 90.5, pp.260-70, 1993.

WELBOURNE, M. The Community of Knowledge. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1986.

WILLIAMS, B. “Deciding to Believe.” In B. Williams (ed.) (1973) pp. 136-151.

WILLIAMS, B. Problems of the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.

WILLIAMS, M. “Responsibility and Reliability.” Philosophical Papers, 37, pp.1-26, 2008.

ZAGZEBSKI, L. Virtues of the Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Downloads

Publicado

2017-12-05

Como Citar

BRASI, L. de. Epistemic Internalism and Knowledge-Relevant Anti-Individualist Responsibility. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 40, n. 4, p. 113–140, 2017. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8651131. Acesso em: 30 set. 2022.

Edição

Seção

Artigos