Resumo
As principais teorias do conteúdo perceptivo são incapazes de explicar o caráter fenomênico singular da experiência perceptiva. Tal dificuldade, conforme argumento, se origina da ausência de uma série de distinções que acaba tornando o problema aparentemente insolúvel. Após analisar brevemente as principais deficiências da teoria representacionalista e do realismo ingênuo, apresento uma proposta que pretende tornar não problemático o fato trivial de percebermos objetos particulares que se apresentam enquanto tais em nossas experiências perceptivas. A proposta, assim como a crítica às demais alternativas, são reconhecidamente apresentadas de forma breve e esquemática. Espera-se ao menos justificar que o caminho proposto é promissor e vale a aposta.Referências
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