Autoengaño y evidencia

Autores

  • Gustavo Fernández Acevedo Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata

Palavras-chave:

Autoengaño. Evidencia. Creencias.

Resumo

Una condición usualmente considerada necesaria para el autoengaño consiste en que la creencia que se adquiere o mantiene no debe ser sostenida por la evidencia a disposición del agente. Sin embargo, esta formulación general de la condición es demasiado amplia y requiere de mayor precisión. En el presente artículo se presenta una caracterización de tal condición que intenta superar las objeciones que pueden elevarse contra las formulaciones existentes.

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Biografia do Autor

Gustavo Fernández Acevedo, Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata

Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata, Departamento de Filosofia Mar del Plata - Argentina

Referências

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Publicado

2018-10-30

Como Citar

ACEVEDO, G. F. Autoengaño y evidencia. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 41, n. 3, p. 125–161, 2018. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8653823. Acesso em: 4 out. 2022.

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