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A brief history of rationality: reason, reasonableness, rationality, and reasons
v. 41 n. 4 (2018), Artigos
v. 41 n. 4 (2018)

A brief history of rationality: reason, reasonableness, rationality, and reasons

Artigos
Publicado 2018-12-04
Karl Schafer
University of California
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Rationality. Reason. Reasons. History of modern philosophy. Rationalization.

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SCHAFER, Karl. A brief history of rationality: reason, reasonableness, rationality, and reasons. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 41, n. 4, p. 501–529, 2018. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654135. Acesso em: 18 abr. 2024.
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Resumo

The title really says it all, doesn't it?
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Referências

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