Banner Portal
Knowing what I have done
PDF

Palavras-chave

Practical knowledge. Intentional action. Action and time. Anscombe.

Como Citar

HAASE, Mathias. Knowing what I have done. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 41, n. 4, p. 195–253, 2018. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8654148. Acesso em: 19 abr. 2024.

Resumo

The literature on agentive or practical knowledge tends to be focused on knowing what one is doing or what one is going to do. Knowing what one has done and has achieved thereby seems to be another matter. In fact, achievements are often taken to be beyond the ken of practical knowledge. I argue that this is a mistake. The intelligibility of the very idea of practical knowledge depends on the possibility of knowing one's achievements in the same manner. For if it is to be intelligible as knowledge of the actuality of one's action in the material world, knowing what one is doing has to include knowledge of what one has done so far.
PDF

Referências

ANSCOMBE, G.E.M. Intention. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000.

ANSCOMBE, G.E.M. “Before and After”. In Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: Collected Philosophical Papers Vol III, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 180-195, 1981.

ARISTOTLE. The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. By Barnes J., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

ARISTOTLE. Nicomachean Ethics, trans. By Broadie, S., Rowe, C., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

ARISTOTLE. De Interpretatione. In Barnes (1984, Vol. I).

ARISTOTLE. Physics. In Barnes (1984, Vol. I).

ARISTOTLE. Poetics. In Barnes (1984, Vol. II).

BRATMAN, M. Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987.

CASTAÑEDA, H.N. “‘He’: A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness”. Ratio, 8, pp. 130-157, 1966.

DAVIDSON, D. Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980.

DAVIDSON, D. “Agency“. In R. Binkley, R. Brounaugh, A. Marras (ed.), Agent, Action, and Reason, University of Toronto Press, 1971. Repr. in D. Davidson (1980), pp. 43-61.

DAVIDSON, D. “Intending”. In Y. Yovel (ed.), Philosophy of History and Action, D. Reidel and The Agnes Press. 1978. Repr. in D. Davidson (1980), pp. 83-102.

DAVIDSON, D. “The Logical Form of Action Sentences”. In N. Rescher (ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967. Repr. in D. Davidson (1980), pp. 105-148.

DONNELLAN, K. “Knowing What I’m Doing”, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 60, No. 40, pp. 401-409, 1963.

FALVEY, K. “Knowledge in Intention”, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 99, pp. 21-44, 2000.

FORD, A., HORNSBY, J., STOUTLAND, F. (ed.). Essays on Anscombe’s Intention, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass. 2011.

FORD, A., HORNSBY, J., STOUTLAND, F. (ed.). “The Province of Human Agency”, Noûs 52 (3), pp. 697-720, 2018.

GEACH, P.T. “On Beliefs About Oneself”. Analysis, 18 (1), pp. 23-24, 1957.

KOSMAN, A. “Acting: Drama as the Mimesis of Praxis”. In Virtues of Thought: Essays on Plato and Aristotle, , Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp. 94-118, 2014.

HAASE, M. “Knowing By Doing”. In Hinshelwood, A., Gebbes A., Beings and Doings, Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

LAVIN, D. “Must There Be Basic Action?”, Noûs 47 (2), pp. 273-301, 2013.

MARCUS, E. “Practical Knowledge as Knowledge of a Normative Judgment”, IN THIS VOLUME

MARCUS, E. Rational Causation. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012.

MARX, K., ENGELS, F. Die Deutsche Ideologie, in: Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels Werke, Bd. 3, Berlin: Dietz Verlag. 1978.

MARX, K. Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a.M. 2009.

MCDOWELL, J. “Some Remarks on Intention in Action”, The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy, 6, pp. 1–18, 2011.

MCDOWELL, J. “How Receptive Knowledge Relates to Practical Knowledge”, published in German as “Zum Verhältnis von rezeptivem und praktischem Wissen”, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 3, pp. 387–401, 2013.

MORAN, R. Authority and Estrangement, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

PARSONS, T. Events in the Semantics of English: A Study in Subatomic Semantics, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990.

PAUL, S. “How We Know What We’re Doing”, Philosopher’s Imprint, Vol. 9, No. 11, 2009.

RÖDL, S. Self-Consciousness, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007.

RYLE, G. The Concept of Mind, , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984, 151

SCHWENKLER, J. “Understanding ‘Practical Knowledge’”, Philosopher’s Imprint, Vol. 15, No. 15, 2015.

SETIYA, K. “Explaining Action”. In Rationalism Without Reasons, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 21-76, 2007.

SETIYA, K. “Practical Knowledge”. Ethics, 118, pp. 388-409, 2008.

SETIYA, K. “Knowing How”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. CXII, pp. 285-307, 2012.

SETIYA, K. “Anscombe on Practical Knowledge”. In Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 156-168, 2016.

SIEGEL, S. “The Phenomenology of Efficacy”, Philosophical Topics, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2005.

SOPHOCLES, Oedipus Tyrannus, in: Theban Plays, Trans. by P. Meineck and P. Woodruff, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004.

STROUD, B. “Doing Something Intentionally and Knowing That You Are Doing It”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 43 (1), pp. 1-12, 2013.

THOMPSON, M. “Naïve Action Theory”. In Life and Action, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp. 85-146, 2008

THOMPSON, M. “Anscombe’s Intention and Practical Knowledge” in: Ford (2011), pp. 198-210.

VELLEMAN, D. Practical Reflection, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

VELLEMAN, D. The Possibility of Practical Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

VELLEMAN, D. “Time for Action”. In The Possibility of Practical Reason. Second Edition, Michigan: Maize Books, pp. 330-345, 2015.

Downloads

Não há dados estatísticos.