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S5-denying approach to relativized metaphysical modality


Metaphysical modality
Modal logic
Relativized modality

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FURTADO, F. S5-denying approach to relativized metaphysical modality. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 43, n. 1, p. 1–40, 2020. Disponível em: Acesso em: 28 set. 2023.


This paper is organised as follows: first, I present Salmon’s theory of modality (which I call ‘S5-denying approach to relativized metaphysical modality’) and compare it with the standard interpretation of modality: ‘the nonrelativized S5-friendly interpretation of metaphysical modality’. Second, I explain Murray and Wilson’s ‘two-dimensional S5-friendly interpretation of relativized metaphysical modality’. In the third and last part, I put forward a few arguments against Murray and Wilson’s attempt to provide an essentialist S5-friendly theory for modality. In general, this paper argues that if one wants to hold an essentialist theory for relativized (metaphysical) modality, then his best option in the market right now is to stick with Salmon’s proposal, which better represents a genuine essentialist interpretation of relativized metaphysical modality.



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