Palavras-chave
Raciocínio prático
Como Citar
Resumo
O objetivo deste artigo é analisar o papel da lógica como uma verdadeira ferramenta para o raciocínio ordinário. Em primeiro lugar, apresentamos uma visão geral das limitações do enfoque chamado “logicista" que usa a lógica como uma linguagem de representação para teorias ordinárias. Depois, chamamos a atenção para uma nítida distinção entre raciocínio teórico e prático, de tal modo que podemos criticar não somente os raciocinadores idealistas, mas também o raciocínio baseado na racionalidade mínima. Finalmente, esboçamos as linhas principais do que deve ser entendido por raciocínio prático.
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Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Copyright (c) 1994 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
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