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O simpósio deste livro é composto por um resumo do livro Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology (Springer, 2018) de Nuno Venturinha juntamente com quatro comentários críticos sobre diferentes aspectos do livro de Marcelo Carvalho, João Vergílio Gallerani Cuter, Marcos Silva e Darlei Dallgnol , e as respostas do autor.
Referências
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