Is the problem of conflicting intentions a genuine problem? Some remarks on gómez-torrente´s “roads to reference”
Palavras-chave:Referência, Demonstrativos, Indexicais, Filosofia da linguagem
In this brief discussion piece I try to offer some considerations in favor of the so-called Simple Intention Theory of demonstratives, which is rejected by Gómez-Torrente. I try to show that the main argument offered against the Simple Intention Theory appears to be based on false data.
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