Is the problem of conflicting intentions a genuine problem? Some remarks on gómez-torrente´s “roads to reference”

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Palavras-chave:

Referência, Demonstrativos, Indexicais, Filosofia da linguagem

Resumo

In this brief discussion piece I try to offer some considerations in favor of the so-called Simple Intention Theory of demonstratives, which is rejected by Gómez-Torrente. I try to show that the main argument offered against the Simple Intention Theory appears to be based on false data.

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Biografia do Autor

Filipe Martone, Universidade Estadual de Campinas

Doutorando em andamento em Filosofia pela Universidade Estadual de Campinas.

Referências

Almog, J. (2014), Referential Mechanics. Direct Reference and the Foundations of Semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Donnellan, K. (1966). “Reference and Definite Descriptions, Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.

Gómez-Torrente, M. (2019), Roads to Reference. An Essay on Reference Fixing in Natural Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

King, J. C. (2013), “Supplementives, the Coordination Account, and Conflicting Intentions”, Philosophical Perspectives 27, 288–311.

Speaks, J. (2016), “The Roles of Speaker and Hearer in the Character of Demonstratives”, Mind 125, 301–39.

Speaks, J. (2017), “A Puzzle about Demonstratives and Semantic Competence”, Philosophical Studies 174, 709– 34.

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Publicado

2021-02-15

Como Citar

MARTONE, F. Is the problem of conflicting intentions a genuine problem? Some remarks on gómez-torrente´s “roads to reference”. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 43, n. 4, p. 49–58, 2021. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664458. Acesso em: 6 out. 2022.

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