Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone

Autores

Palavras-chave:

Intenções de fixação de referência, Demonstrativos, Intenções conflitantes

Resumo

Filipe Martone argues that reference-fixing intentions where the intended object is represented by means of a description can never fix the reference of a demonstrative, and that a speaker, as a matter of empirical fact, never has simultaneous perceptual and non-perceptual reference-fixing intentions that she can intend as fixing the reference of a demonstrative. In this note I reject Martone’s arguments for these claims.

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Biografia do Autor

Mario Gómez-Torrente, Universidade Nacional Autônoma do México

Pesquisador do Instituto de Pesquisas Filosóficas da Universidade Nacional Autônoma do México (UNAM).




Referências

Gómez-Torrente, M. (2015), “Quantifiers and Referential Use”, in A. Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and Quantifiers: Themes in Logic, Metaphysics, and Language, Springer, Dordrecht, 97–124.

Gómez-Torrente, M. (2019), Roads to Reference. An Essay on Reference Fixing in Natural Language, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Kaplan, D. (1977), “Demonstratives”, in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989, 481–563.

Kaplan, D. (1978), “Dthat”, in P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Volume 9: Pragmatics, Academic Press, New York, 221–43.

Martone, F. (2020), “Is the Problem of Conflicting Intentions a Genuine Problem? Some Remarks on Gómez-Torrente’s Roads to Reference”, Manuscrito, this issue.

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Publicado

2021-02-15

Como Citar

GÓMEZ-TORRENTE, M. Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 43, n. 4, p. 59–73, 2021. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664459. Acesso em: 6 out. 2022.

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