Are conflicting reference-fixing intentions possible? Reply to martone
Palavras-chave:Intenções de fixação de referência, Demonstrativos, Intenções conflitantes
Filipe Martone argues that reference-fixing intentions where the intended object is represented by means of a description can never fix the reference of a demonstrative, and that a speaker, as a matter of empirical fact, never has simultaneous perceptual and non-perceptual reference-fixing intentions that she can intend as fixing the reference of a demonstrative. In this note I reject Martone’s arguments for these claims.
Gómez-Torrente, M. (2015), “Quantifiers and Referential Use”, in A. Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and Quantifiers: Themes in Logic, Metaphysics, and Language, Springer, Dordrecht, 97–124.
Gómez-Torrente, M. (2019), Roads to Reference. An Essay on Reference Fixing in Natural Language, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Kaplan, D. (1977), “Demonstratives”, in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989, 481–563.
Kaplan, D. (1978), “Dthat”, in P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Volume 9: Pragmatics, Academic Press, New York, 221–43.
Martone, F. (2020), “Is the Problem of Conflicting Intentions a Genuine Problem? Some Remarks on Gómez-Torrente’s Roads to Reference”, Manuscrito, this issue.
Copyright (c) 2020 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.