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On descriptivism and natural kind terms. Reply to fernández moreno
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GÓMEZ-TORRENTE, M. On descriptivism and natural kind terms. Reply to fernández moreno. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 43, n. 4, p. 86–96, 2021. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664461. Acesso em: 31 maio. 2023.

Resumo

Luis Fernández Moreno has given a number of arguments that descriptive knowledge or stipulations have a greater role in the fixing of the reference of natural kind terms than I allow in my book Roads to Reference. In this note I criticize Fernández Moreno’s arguments.

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Referências

Fernández Moreno, L. (2020), “Reference Theories and the Relevance of Descriptions”, Manuscrito, this issue.

Gómez-Torrente, M. (2019), Roads to Reference. An Essay on Reference Fixing in Natural Language, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Kripke, S. A. (1972), “Naming and Necessity”, in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1972, 253–355, 763–9. Book edition with an added preface: Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1980. References to the book edition.

Kripke, S. A. (1986), “A Problem in the Theory of Reference: the Linguistic Division of Labor and the Social Character of Naming”, in V. Cauchy (ed.), Philosophie et Culture (Actes du XVIIe Congrès Mondial de Philosophie), vol, 1, Éditions du Beffroi - Éditions Montmorency, Montreal, 241–247.

Putnam, H. (1973), “Explanation and Reference”, in G. Pearce and P. Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1973, 199–221. Reprinted in Putnam, Philosophical Papers, Volume 2: Mind, Language and Reality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975, 196–214. References to the reprint.

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