A bump in the road



Referência, Solavanco na estrada


Roads to Reference offers a highly valuable contribution to the theory of reference. The arguments in this book are quite convincing and the overall picture presented in it is quite attractive. In what follows I would like to present some critical comments regarding the first chapter of the book, Demonstratives and Conflicting Intentions.


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Biografia do Autor

Ricardo Mena, Universidade Nacional Autônoma do México

Departamento de Filosofia do Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas da Universidade Nacional Autônoma do México.


Gómez-Torrente, M. (2019). Roads to Reference: An Essay on Reference Fixing in Natural Language. Oxford University Press.

Kaplan, D. (1978). Dthat. In P. French, T. Uehling, & H. Wettstein (Eds.) Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, (pp. 383–400). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Kaplan, D. (1989), “Demonstratives”, in J. Almong, J.Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989, 481-563.

King, J. C. (2013), “Supplementives, the Coordination Account, and Conflicting Intentions”, Philosophical Perspectives 27, 288–311.

Nowak, E. (2019). No context, no content, no problem. Mind & Language. Siegel, S. (2002). The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference. Philosophers’ Imprint, 2(1), 1–21.

Speaks, J. (2017), “A puzzle about Demonstratives and Semantic Competence”, Philosophical Studies, 174, 709-34.

Stojnic, U., Stone, M., & Lepore, E. (2013). Deixis (Even without Pointing). Philosophical Perspectives, 27, 502–525.




Como Citar

MENA, R. A bump in the road. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 43, n. 4, p. 177–188, 2021. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664470. Acesso em: 27 set. 2022.