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Solavanco na estrada
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Resumo
Roads to Reference offers a highly valuable contribution to the theory of reference. The arguments in this book are quite convincing and the overall picture presented in it is quite attractive. In what follows I would like to present some critical comments regarding the first chapter of the book, Demonstratives and Conflicting Intentions.
Referências
Gómez-Torrente, M. (2019). Roads to Reference: An Essay on Reference Fixing in Natural Language. Oxford University Press.
Kaplan, D. (1978). Dthat. In P. French, T. Uehling, & H. Wettstein (Eds.) Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, (pp. 383–400). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Kaplan, D. (1989), “Demonstratives”, in J. Almong, J.Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989, 481-563.
King, J. C. (2013), “Supplementives, the Coordination Account, and Conflicting Intentions”, Philosophical Perspectives 27, 288–311.
Nowak, E. (2019). No context, no content, no problem. Mind & Language. Siegel, S. (2002). The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference. Philosophers’ Imprint, 2(1), 1–21.
Speaks, J. (2017), “A puzzle about Demonstratives and Semantic Competence”, Philosophical Studies, 174, 709-34.
Stojnic, U., Stone, M., & Lepore, E. (2013). Deixis (Even without Pointing). Philosophical Perspectives, 27, 502–525.
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