According to Ricardo Mena, a demonstrative refers to all the objects that the utterer has an intention for it to refer to, which may be more than one in cases where her referential intentions conflict. In this note I argue that Mena’s proposal has several serious problems.
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Mena, R. (2020), “A Bump in the Road. Comments on Roads to Reference”, Manuscrito, this issue.
Nowak, E. (forthcoming), “No Context, no Content, no Problem”, Mind and Language, forthcoming.
Siegel, S. (2002), “The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference”, Philosophers’ Imprint 2, no. 1. Available at: https:www.philosophersimprint.org/002001.
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