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Do conflicting intentions give rise to multiple demonstrative reference? Reply to mena
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Referência
Demonstrativos
Intenções conflitantes

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GÓMEZ-TORRENTE, M. Do conflicting intentions give rise to multiple demonstrative reference? Reply to mena. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 43, n. 4, p. 189–198, 2021. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664471. Acesso em: 26 fev. 2024.

Resumo

According to Ricardo Mena, a demonstrative refers to all the objects that the utterer has an intention for it to refer to, which may be more than one in cases where her referential intentions conflict. In this note I argue that Mena’s proposal has several serious problems.

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Referências

Gómez-Torrente, M. (2019), Roads to Reference. An Essay on Reference Fixing in Natural Language, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Kaplan, D. (1978), “Dthat”, in P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Volume 9: Pragmatics, Academic Press, New York, 221–43.

Mena, R. (2020), “A Bump in the Road. Comments on Roads to Reference”, Manuscrito, this issue.

Nowak, E. (forthcoming), “No Context, no Content, no Problem”, Mind and Language, forthcoming.

Siegel, S. (2002), “The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference”, Philosophers’ Imprint 2, no. 1. Available at: https:www.philosophersimprint.org/002001.

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Copyright (c) 2020 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia

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