Resumo
Thainá Demartini has criticized my view that ordinary natural kind terms refer to vague non-scientific kinds and defended the more traditional view that they refer to precise kinds discovered by science. In this note I reject Demartini’s worries as based on inadequate ontological scruples.
Referências
Demartini, T. (2020), “Natural Kinds and our Semantic Intuitions Along the Road”, Manuscrito, this issue.
Gómez-Torrente, M. (2019), Roads to Reference. An Essay on Reference Fixing in Natural Language, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Putnam, H. (1975), “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ”, in K. Gunderson (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 7: Language, Mind and Knowledge, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 131–93. Reprinted in Putnam, Philosophical Papers, Volume 2: Mind, Language and Reality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975, 215–71. Reference to
the reprint.
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