Ordinary kinds and ontological angst. Reply to demartini

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Termos de tipo numeral, Referência, Ontologia

Resumo

Thainá Demartini has criticized my view that ordinary natural kind terms refer to vague non-scientific kinds and defended the more traditional view that they refer to precise kinds discovered by science. In this note I reject Demartini’s worries as based on inadequate ontological scruples.

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Biografia do Autor

Mario Gómez-Torrente, Universidade Nacional Autônoma do México

Instituto de Pesquisas Filosóficas da Universidade Nacional Autônoma do México (UNAM).

Referências

Demartini, T. (2020), “Natural Kinds and our Semantic Intuitions Along the Road”, Manuscrito, this issue.

Gómez-Torrente, M. (2019), Roads to Reference. An Essay on Reference Fixing in Natural Language, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Putnam, H. (1975), “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ”, in K. Gunderson (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 7: Language, Mind and Knowledge, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 131–93. Reprinted in Putnam, Philosophical Papers, Volume 2: Mind, Language and Reality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975, 215–71. Reference to

the reprint.

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Publicado

2021-02-15

Como Citar

GÓMEZ-TORRENTE, M. Ordinary kinds and ontological angst. Reply to demartini. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 43, n. 4, p. 215–220, 2021. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664473. Acesso em: 1 out. 2022.

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