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Hume's famous account of our idea of the identity through time of persons and objects is based upon a principle of individuation accord harges which the idea of numerical sameness properly applies only to unchanging objects. Hume derives this idea of identity from a fiction of the imagination concerning the possibility of time without change. I argue that the puzzle Hume raises concerning identity and change is an important one in the form that he raised it, and not misguided as some have suggested; however, I show that his recourse to the duration fiction in attempting to account for our ascriptions of identity lands him in a vicious circularity. In the course of these arguments I take a close look at the nature of Humean fictions. In the final section I then suggest that there are resources in the Treatise for a more successful Humean account of the idea or fiction' of identity, based primarily on certain aspects of Hume's theory of abstract ideas.
Referências
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Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Copyright (c) 1997 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
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