Resumo
In this paper, we re-evaluate some of Hume's most famous arguments in Book II and III in the light of some of the positions he holds in Book I of the “Treatise”. Hume’s Representation Argument in Book II holds that a passion is “an original existence... and contains not any representative quality”(T’413). We evaluate this claim against the backdrop of Hume’ general account of impressions and ideas as found in Book I, and argue that Hume holds that no impressions represent: representation is a function limited to ideas. We then exmine the role the Representation Argument plays in Hume’s arguments, in Book II and III, about the inertia of reason with respect to motivation. Our interpretation of these arguments is constrained by Book I’s, “Of the influence of belief”, where Hume argues that it is a distinguishing characteristic of at least some beliefs that they do indeed motivate. The resulting interpretations hold no comfort for noncognitivistic readings of Hume.
Referências
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