Resumo
In this paper I critically discuss Foot’s criticismo of morality as a system of categorial imperatives. I develop some possible lines of reply based on Kant’s work. I also examine McDowell’s reply to Foot, and argue that his reply is not as far from Kant as he seems to think.
Referências
Foot, P. (1958-9). Moral Beliefs, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Reprinted in Foot (1978), pp. 110-31.
Foot, P. (1963). Hume on Moral Judgement, in Pears, D. (ed.), David Hume. London: Macmillan. Reprinted in Foot (1978), pp. 74-80.
Foot, P. (1972). Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives, The Philosophical Review 81, Number 3. Reprinted in Foot (1978), pp. 157-73.
Foot, P. (1978). Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press).
KantT, I. (1785). Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Translated by H. J. paton. Second Edition. (New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1964).
McDowell, J. (1978). Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suplementary Volume 52, pp. 13-29.
Wittgenstein, L. (1989). Vortag über Ethik, in Vortag über Ethik und andere Kleine Schriflen. Edited by Joachim Schulte (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp).

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