Vagueness and the problem of evil

a new reply to van inwagen

Autores

Palavras-chave:

Vagueness, Problem of Evil, Peter van Inwagen

Resumo

One of the few points of agreement between most theists and non-theists working on the problem of evil is that the existence of a perfect God is incompatible with the existence of pointless evil. In a series of influential papers, however, Peter van Inwagen has argued that careful attention to the reasoning behind this claim reveals fatal difficulties related to the Sorites Paradox. In this paper, I explain van Inwagen’s appeal to sorites reasoning, distinguish between two different arguments in his work, and argue that they both commit the same so-far-unnoticed mistake.

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Biografia do Autor

Luis Oliveira, University of Houston

PhD in philosophy from the University of Massachusetts Amherst. Assistant Professor at University of Houston. Houston, Texas (U.S.A).

Referências

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Publicado

2021-12-13

Como Citar

OLIVEIRA, L. Vagueness and the problem of evil: a new reply to van inwagen. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 44, n. 4, p. 49–82, 2021. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8668864. Acesso em: 27 set. 2022.

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