Should god believe the liar? a non-dialetheist paraconsistent approach to god’s omniscience



Paradoxes, Omnscience, Truth, Dialetheism, Situation semantics


In this paper, we discuss a family of arguments that show the inconsistency of the concept of omniscience, which is one of the central attributes of the theistic God. We introduce three member of this family: Grim’s Divine Liar Paradox, Milne’s Paradox and our own Divine Curry. They can be seen as theological counterparts of well-known semantic paradoxes. We argue that the very simple dialetheist response to these paradoxes doesn’t work well and then introduce our own response based on a framework that we call Logic of Impossible Truths (LIT). LIT is a non-dialetheist paraconsistent logic designed to represent divine ominiscience and to preserve the transparency of the truth predicate and which semantics rests on the concept of situation. Since some rules of classical logic are not valid in LIT, we are in a position to block the derivation of the paradoxes. Thus, LIT offers a way out of the dilemma of accepting that there are true contradictions (dialetheism) or giving up the idea that there is an all-powerful, omniscient and perfectly good being (atheism).


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Biografia do Autor

Guilherme Araújo Cardoso, Federal University of Ouro Preto

Post-Doctorate by the State University of Campinas, UNICAMP. Adjunct Professor at the Federal University of Ouro Preto (MG).

Sérgio Ricardo Neves de Miranda, Federal University of Ouro Preto

PhD in Philosophy from the University of Bielefeld, Germany. Associate Professor of the Philosophy Department at the Federal University of Ouro Preto (MG).


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Como Citar

CARDOSO, G. A. .; MIRANDA, S. R. N. de . Should god believe the liar? a non-dialetheist paraconsistent approach to god’s omniscience. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 44, n. 4, p. 518–563, 2022. Disponível em: Acesso em: 26 set. 2022.