Palavras-chave
Verdade
Davidson
Como Citar
Resumo
Em la tradición semática que se inicia em Frege y el joven Wittgenstein, la nócion de verdad es uma noción primitiva respecto a la de significado. Davidson ha reforzado el carácter básico de aquella noción y formulado uma propuesta de reducción semântica de las capitales nociones pragmáticas. En el presente artículo se intenta hacer patentes las deficiencias de este ensayo de Davidson. Se avanza a este objeto um argumento para justifcar la tesis de que criterios veritativo-condicionales no pueden fundamentar la interpretación de los actos de habla.
Referências
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Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Copyright (c) 1995 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
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