Na-na, na-na, boo-boo, the accuracy of your philosophical beliefs is doo-doo



Accuracy, Skeptical-Dogmatism


The paper argues that adopting a form of skepticism, Skeptical-Dogmatism, that recommends disbelieving each philosophical position in many multi-proposition disputes- disputes where there are three or more contrary philosophical views-leads to a higher ratio of true to false beliefs than the ratio of the “average philosopher” (as indicated by survey data). Hence, Skeptical-Dogmatists have more accurate beliefs than the average philosopher. As a corollary, most philosophers would improve the accuracy of their beliefs if they adopted Skeptical-Dogmatism.


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Biografia do Autor

Mark Walker, New Mexico State University

New Mexico State University Department of Philosophy Las Cruces, New Mexico, USA.


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Como Citar

WALKER, M. . Na-na, na-na, boo-boo, the accuracy of your philosophical beliefs is doo-doo. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 45, n. 2, p. 1–49, 2022. Disponível em: Acesso em: 4 out. 2022.