A memory-based argument for non-reductionism about the transtemporal identity of persons

Autores

Palavras-chave:

Direct realism, Memory, Personal identity, Non-reductionism, Temporal experience

Resumo

Does memory constitue diachronic identity? Or does it presuppose it? Butler has claimed that it is the latter, and, in this paper, I will side with him. My argumentation, however, will take a different route. My claim is not that memory presupposes transtemporal identity because I can only remember episodes that have happened to me. Rather, I will probe the idea that some properties of episodic remembering may be such that accounting for them requires us to posit a subject the transtemporal identity of which can't be reduced to continuity. These properties are the pastness of the recollected episode coupled with its first-personal accessibility. The argument will make heavy use of the experience of temporality.

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Biografia do Autor

Daniel Inan, Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem

Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem, Department of Philosophy, Magyarország, Hungary.

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Publicado

2022-07-20

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INAN, D. A memory-based argument for non-reductionism about the transtemporal identity of persons. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 45, n. 2, p. 161–216, 2022. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8670448. Acesso em: 4 out. 2022.

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