Resumo
Os contrafactuais tornaram-se uma importante área de interesse interdisciplinar, especialmente em lógica, filosofia da linguagem, epistemologia, metafísica, psicologia, teoria da decisão, e até mesmo inteligência artificial. Neste estudo, propomos uma nova forma de análise para os contrafactuais: a análise por complexidade algorítmica. Inspirado na Semântica dos Mundos Possíveis de Lewis-Stalnaker, o método proposto permite uma nova interpretação do debate entre David Lewis e Robert Stalnaker sobre as suposições de Limite e Singularidade. Além de outros resultados, oferecemos uma nova forma de responder aos problemas levantados por Goodman e Quine em relação à indefinição, dependência do contexto e a não monotonicidade dos contrafatuais. Dialogando com a literatura, este estudo procurará trazer novas idéias e ferramentas para este debate. Esperamos que nosso método de análise possa tornar os contrafactuais mais compreensíveis de uma forma intuitivamente plausível, e uma maneira filosoficamente justificável, alinhada com a maneira como geralmente pensamos sobre as propostas contrafactuais e nosso raciocínio imaginativo.
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