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Mi objetivo en este artículo es defender una elucidación reduccionista parcial del concepto de lo innato en ciencias cognitivas. En primer lugar, especifico las condiciones mínimas para una elucidación de lo innato. En segundo lugar, presento los principales enfoques que se han adoptado en la discusión, es decir, las propuestas reduccionistas, autonomistas y escépticas. Luego de ofrecer argumentos versus el escepticismo y las propuestas autonomistas, presento en detalle lo que considero es una elucidación parcial de lo innato en términos de control genético, mostrando cómo un concepto de la biología del desarrollo puede ser provechosamente utilizado para elucidar el concepto de lo innato en ciencias cognitivas. Por último, explicito las ventajas filosóficas de mi propuesta.
Abstract:
The aim of the present paper is to defend a partial reductionist explication of the concept of innateness in cognitive science. Firstly, I specify a set of minimal conditions for the analysis of the innateness concept. Secondly, I present the main proposals in dispute, namely, the reductionist, autonomist and skeptical accounts of innateness. After criticizing both skeptical and autonomist positions, I develop a partial account of innateness as genetic control, showing how that concept from developmental biology could be used to explicate innateness in cognitive science. Finally, I mention some philosophical advantages of my proposal.
Keywords: Innateness. Cognitive sciences. Developmental biology. Genetic control. Gene regulatory networks.
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