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Abstract
Since its introduction by Evans (1982), the generality constraint (GC) has been invoked by various philosophers for different purposes. Our purpose here is, first, to clarify what precisely the GC states by way of an interpretive framework, the GC Schema, and second, to demonstrate in terms of this framework some problems that arise if one invokes the GC (or systematicity) without clearly specifying an appropriate interpretation. By utilizing the GC Schema these sorts of problems can be avoided, and we thus propose it as a tool to facilitate argumentation that appeals to the GC.References
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