Como aprendemos o que é dor? uma análise crítica do §244 das investigações filosóficas de Wittgenstein

Abstract

In this paper I mainly draw attention to the largely discussed § 244 of the Philosophical Investigations of Ludwig Wittgenstein. I begin by providing what I take to be a right reconstruction of the argument in it, in which Wittgenstein maintains that, in contradistinction to the presuppositions of the supporter of a private language, we learn words for sensations, like “pain”, for example, not by correlating the sign directly with the corresponding sensation. Instead, “pain” is learned in connection with the natural expression of pain, with pain-behavior, so that the word takes the place of the natural expression. Next, I develop two lines of criticism on Wittgenstein’s argument. First, I argue that Wittgenstein does not explain how the learner substitutes the conventional expression for the natural one. Second, I maintain that, in his explanation of how we learn words for sensations, Wittgenstein shares one of the most important presuppositions of the private language, the very one that he wanted to discard once and for all, namely, that one can know from her own case what pain is.