Keywords
Psychology
Theory of action
Davidson
Rachlin
Teleological behaviorism.
How to Cite
Abstract
This paper aims at construing the notions of motion, behavior and action in connection with each other. First, it is argued that motion is an event lawfully described by means of some mechanical theory, and its concepts and models. Likewise, behavior is the kind of human (or animal) event functionally described by means of probabilistic models that connect what different individuals do in circumstances where a mechanical description is not relevantly explicative. Viewed this way, behavior is an essentially social phenomenon. Finally, action is the kind of human occurrence that cannot be lawfully explained. The concept of action thus argued for is fundamentally residual in relation to the concepts of behavior and motion.
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