Keywords
Eliminationism
Phenonyms
How to Cite
Abstract
In this work I present the lines of argument that lead to the eliminative thesis, one that comes from considerations concerning the relationship between a psychology of meaning as a psychology / mature neuroscience, and another from metaphysical considerations about the nature of phenomena. mental problems and their causal interaction with the physical world, and try to show the inadequacy of both argumentative lines. Secondly, I mention three lines of criticism of eliminative attempts, showing their weaknesses. Finally, I offer an alternative argumentative line to support the implausibility of eliminativism based on considerations about the scope of a possible radical conceptual shift on some ordinary mentalist concepts that eliminativism seems to suppose.
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