Abstract
This issue aims to explore the nature of rational agency, both practical and epistemic. Typically, exercises of our rational agency are governed by certain practical and epistemic norms. However, it is far from clear what exactly these norms are, or how we are to understand the way in which they govern us in acting and believing.References
HORST, DAVID (2015). Actions and Accidents. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):300-325.
HORST, DAVID (2017). Enkratic Agency. European Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):47-67.
TENENBAUM, SERGIO (2007). Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press.
TENENBAUM, SERGIO (2016). Reconsidering Intentions. Noûs 52 (2):443-472.
Downloads
Download data is not yet available.