Palavras-chave
The problem of free will
Peter van Inwagen
Moral responsibility
Determinism.
Peter van Inwagen
Moral responsibility
Determinism.
Como Citar
MERLUSSI, Pedro. Book review: VAN INWAGEN, Peter. Thinking about Free Will. (Cambridge University Press, 2017, 232 pages.). Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 42, n. 1, p. 211–218, 2019. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8656534. Acesso em: 18 abr. 2024.
Resumo
In this review, I discuss some aspects of van Inwagen’s insights with respect to the notions of free will and determinism. My main focus is on the author’s formulation of the free will problem.
Referências
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BEEBEE, H. Local miracle compatibilism. Noûs 37 (2): 258–277, 2003.
BENNETT, J. Counterfactuals and temporal direction. The Philosophical Review 93 (1): 57-91, 1984.
CARTWRIGHT, N. & MERLUSSI, P. Are laws of nature consistent with contingency?. In: Laws of nature, eds. W. Ott and, 2018. L. PATTO, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
DORR, C. Against counterfactual miracles'. The Philosophical Review, 125 (2): 241–286, 2016.
GOODMAN, J. Knowledge, counterfactuals and determinism. Philosophical Studies 172 (9): 2275-2278, 2015.
MCKAY, T. J. and JOHNSON, D. A reconsideration of an argument against compatibilism. Philosophical Topics 24 (2): 113–122, 1996.
LEWIS, D. Are we free to break the laws?. Theoria 47: 113-21, 1981.
BEEBEE, H. Local miracle compatibilism. Noûs 37 (2): 258–277, 2003.
BENNETT, J. Counterfactuals and temporal direction. The Philosophical Review 93 (1): 57-91, 1984.
CARTWRIGHT, N. & MERLUSSI, P. Are laws of nature consistent with contingency?. In: Laws of nature, eds. W. Ott and, 2018. L. PATTO, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
DORR, C. Against counterfactual miracles'. The Philosophical Review, 125 (2): 241–286, 2016.
GOODMAN, J. Knowledge, counterfactuals and determinism. Philosophical Studies 172 (9): 2275-2278, 2015.
MCKAY, T. J. and JOHNSON, D. A reconsideration of an argument against compatibilism. Philosophical Topics 24 (2): 113–122, 1996.
LEWIS, D. Are we free to break the laws?. Theoria 47: 113-21, 1981.
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