Abstract
In this paper I shall offer a strategy to bypass a counter-example which Gareth Evans offers against Quine's well-known. Thesis of Referential Inscrutability. The bulk of the paper will be devoted to developing an extension of a proposal that Christopher Hookway offers on behalf of the Quinean which avoids losing its empirical adequacy. I shall argue that Evans' counter-example cannot refute Quine's thesis.
References
Garzón, F.C. (1999). A Connectionist Defence of the Inscrutability Thesis and the Elimination of the Mental unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Glasgow.
Garzón, F.C. (2000a). A Connectionist Defence of the Inscrutability Thesis, Mind and Language 15, pp. 465-80.
Garzón, F.C. (2000b). Semantic Perversity, Teorema XIX, pp. 65-77.
Garzón, F.C. (s.d). Is Simplicity Alethic for Semantic Theories?
Evans, G. (1975). Identity and Predication, The Journal of Philosophy 72, pp. 343-63.
Hookway, C. (1988). Quine (Oxford, Polity Press).
Quine, W.V. (1960). Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press).
Quine, W.V. (1970). Grades of Theoreticity. In: Foster, L. and Swanson J.W. (eds.) Experience and Theory (London, Duckworth).
Quine, W.V. (1990). Pursuit of Truth (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press).
Wright (1997). The Indeterminacy of Translation. In: Hale, B. and Wright, C. (eds.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (Oxford, Blackwell), pp. 397-426.
![Creative Commons License](http://i.creativecommons.org/l/by/4.0/88x31.png)
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Copyright (c) 2001 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia