Abstract
In this paper I undertake to characterise the popular libertarian notion of freedom. I argue that it is most obviously threatened by a combination of two theses, materialism and the determinacy of physics. It might be saved by denying just materialism, but materialism is highly plausible if physics is deterministic. It cannot be saved by denying just the determinacy of physics. It might be saved by denying both materialism and the determinacy of physics, but materialism is not made much less plausible if physics is indeterministic. Then I consider the implications of accepting that libertarian freedom is an illusion. I argue that it would be a mistake to think that it entails fatalism, and that it would be a mistake to think that it undermines all forms of moral responsibility. But it plays an important role in undermining the view that punishments and rewards can be given purely backward-looking justifications in terms of retribution and desert. Such a view applies to individual acts, institutions and emotions.
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