Keywords
Reference transmission
Ceteris paribus clauses
Semantic knowledge
Descriptivism vs. Anti-descriptivism
How to Cite
Abstract
In chapter 3 of the very welcome and enjoyable Roads to Reference, “Proper Names and Referential Indeterminacy”, Mario Gómez Torrente proposes a set of conventions establishing merely sufficient conditions for the fixation and transmission of the reference of proper names. There are some aspects of the undoubtedly very original and rigorous proposal that have prompted me the brief comments that follow, grouped into three sections.
References
Devitt, Michael (2015). “Should Proper Names Still Seem So Problematic?”, in A. Bianchi (Ed.) On Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 109-43.
Devitt, M. & Kim Sterelny (1987). Language and Reality. Oxford: Blackwell. Dickie, Imogen (2011). “How Proper Names Refer”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111: 43-78.
Gómez Torrente, Mario (2019). Roads to Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kaplan, David (1989). “Afterthoughts”, in Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (Eds.) Themes from Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 565-614.
Kripke, Saul (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Spohn, Wolfang (2002). "Laws, Ceteris Paribus Conditions, and the Dynamics of Belief", Erkenntnis 57: 373-394.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Copyright (c) 2020 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
Downloads
