Keywords
Indução
Investigação
How to Cite
Abstract
Hume´s theory of casual inference is frequently read as a description of procedures os scientific enquiry, thus restricted to induction by simple enumeration. However, a close look at Hume´s own way of enquiring
Throughout his Science of points to a much broader approach. Hume´s alleged commitment to Newton´s expiremental method gives room for the conjectural seach for those general causes most adequate to explain observed phenomena. Furthermore, such a procedure is compatible with the widespread – though somehow nuclear – acceptance of the role of hypotheses in empirical Science in Hume´s time.
References
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Copyright (c) 1997 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
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