Palavras-chave
Números reais
Metafilosofia
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Resumo
One of the most striking and prominent aspects of Wittgenstein’s later thought is his conception of the nature of philosophy. However, other aspects of his thought do not seem to be entirely in harmony with these meta-philosophical views. This lack of fit is especially apparent in his philosophy of mathematics. I draw attention to Wittgenstein’s views on real numbers as an especially clear case in point. I suggest a way in which we may be able to understand this tension, if not eliminate it, by reminding ourselves of the very early origin of Wittgenstein’s views on the nature of philosophy.
Referências
Da Silva, J.J. (1993). Wittgenstein on Irrational Numbers, in K. Puhl (ed.) Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics (Vienna, Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky).
Drury, M. O’C (1981). Conversations with Wittegenstein, repr. In R. Rhees (ed.) Recollections of Wittgenstein (OUP 1984).
Dummett, M. (1959). Wittegenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy Review LXVIII, reprinted in Dummett (1978).
Dummett, M. (1960). Oxford Philosophy, New Blackfriars, reprinted in Dummett Truth and Other Enigmas (London, Duckworth, 1978).
Marion, M. (1998). Wittgenstein, Finitism and the Foundations of Mathematics (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
Monk, R. (1990). Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (London, Cape).
Wittgenstein, L. (1967). Philosophical investigation 3rd edn, ed. G.E.M. Anscombre and R. Rhees (Oxford, Blackwell).
Wittgenstein, L. (1974). Philosophical Grammar ed. R. Rhees (Oxford, Blackwell).
Wittgenstein, L. (1975). Philosophical Remarks ed. R. Rhees (Oxford, Blackwell).
Wittgenstein, L. (1976). Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge 1939 ed. C.Diamond (Ithaca,Cornell University Press).
Wittgenstein, L. (1978). Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, 3rd edn. Edited by G.H. von Wright, R.Rhees and G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford, Blackwell).
Wittgenstein, L. (1979a). Notes on Logic, in Notebooks, 1914-1916 2nd edition, ed. G. H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford,Blackwell).
Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Copyright (c) 1999 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
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