Abstract
The paper focuses on the mind-body problem and discusses to what extent the computacional modelo f the mind can cast some light on this traditional issue.
Section I is devoted to trace the contours of the distinction between the mental and the physical by concentrating the analysis in the philosophical Works of R. Descartes. Section II explores some contemporary approaches to this question such as the linguistic survey developed by G.Ryle, the identity-theory and eliminative materialism. Section III focuses on H. Putnam’s functionalism and his analogy between minds and computers. Finally, in section IV, a new computer metaphor based on connectionism is proposed as na alternative to accommodate conceptual difficulties involved in the mindy-body problem.
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