Intentional and physical relations

Abstract

According to Bretano, all and only mental phenomena are characterized by their Intentionality. That is, they are directed upon objects: In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, etc. This suggestion does not seem to tell us much about peculiarity of the mental, since the same holds true for many physical phenomena: In hitting something is hitted, in eating something is eaten, etc. So, what is the peculiarity of the mental that justifies calling it ‘Intentional’? I would attack this question by focusing on the raltional character of mental and physical acts.I try to show in part A of this paper that Intentional relations are ‘essential” in a way physical relations are not, since the former are necessary while  the later are contingent. In part B, I argue that  physical ‘relations’ are not real relations, and that they can be fully described in a non-relational language. Mental relations, on the other hand, cannot be fully described ina non-relational language. If so, no psycho-physical reduction is possible. In part C it is shown that mental ‘relations’ too are not real relations, but that nevertheless their Intentionality distinguishes mental acts sharply from physical acts and excludes the possibility of psycho-physical reduction.