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A SECOND OPINION ON RELATIVE TRUTH
Vol. 38 Núm. 2 (2015), Artigos
Vol. 38 Núm. 2 (2015)

A SECOND OPINION ON RELATIVE TRUTH

Artigos
Publicado 2015-11-25
Ramiro Caso
Universidade de Buenos Aires
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1421-2739
PDF (Português (Brasil))

Palabras clave

Truth relativism. Radical relativism. Truth-theoretic semantics

Cómo citar

CASO, Ramiro. A SECOND OPINION ON RELATIVE TRUTH. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía, Campinas, SP, v. 38, n. 2, p. 65–88, 2015. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8641920. Acesso em: 16 ago. 2024.
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Resumen

In ‘An undermining diagnosis of relativism about truth’, Horwich claims that the notion of relative truth is either explanatorily sterile or explanatorily superfluous. In the present paper, I argue that Horwich’s explanatory demands set the bar unwarrantedly high: given the philosophical import of the theorems of a truth-theoretic semantic theory, Horwich’s proposed explananda, what he calls acceptance facts, are too indirect for us to expect a complete explanation of them in terms of the deliverances of a theory of meaning based on the notion of relative truth. And, to the extent that there might be such an explanation in certain cases, there is no reason to expect relative truth to play an essential, ineliminable role, nor to endorse the claim that it should play such a role in order to be a theoretically useful notion.
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Citas

ALMOG, J., PERRY, J., WETTSTEIN, H. (eds.). Themes from Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.

CASO, R. “Assertion and relative truth”. Synthese, 191, pp. 1309-1325, 2014. URL: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11229-013-0329-6 DAVIDSON, D. “Truth and meaning”. Synthese, 17, pp. 304–323, 1967. URL: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00485035 GARCÍA-CARPINTERO, M., KÖLBEL, M. (eds). Relative Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

HORWICH, P. Truth-Meaning-Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

HORWICH, P. “An undermining diagnosis of relativism about truth”. Mind, 123, pp. 733–752, 2014. URL: http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/content/123/491/733 KAPLAN, D. “Demonstratives: an essay on the semantics, logic, metaphysics, and epistemology of demonstratives and other indexicals”. In J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (eds.) (1989), pp. 481–563.

KÖLBEL, M. “Two dogmas of Davidsonian semantics”. The Journal of Philosophy, 98, pp. 613–635, 2001. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3649462 KÖLBEL, M. “Truth in semantics”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 32, pp. 242–257, 2008a.

KÖLBEL, M. “Motivations for relativism”. In M. García-Carpintero and M. Kölbel (eds.) (2008), pp. 1–38, 2008b.

KÖLBEL, M. “The evidence for relativism”. Synthese, 166, pp. 375–395, 2009. URL: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11229-007-9281-7 MACFARLANE, J. Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2014. URL: http://johnmacfarlane.net/reltruth.pdf

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